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Singapore electricity market has been under deregulation since mid 1990s. The 
underlying motive of the restructuring campaign is the belief that the privatized industry 
is more effective than the all-regulated market to achieve economic efficiency. However, 
as many researches have illustrated (Green & Newberry, 1992; Wolak & Patrick, 1996; 
Borenstain & Bushnell, 1999; Wolfram, 1999; Wolak, 2003), the success of the 
restructuring of the electricity market depends heavily on whether the market design 
could hedge the market power exercised by the generators. The objective of this thesis is 
to trace the sources and identify possible exercise of the market power by the generation 
companies in the Singapore New Electricity Market. By analyzing the energy market 
price and generation capacity using various methods, this research has found evidence for 

























Electricity market reforms have been undertaken world-widely in the past few decades. 
The first electricity market deregulation took place in England and Wales back in 1990. 
Subsequently, many other energy markets such as those in Norway and Sweden, New 
Zealand, Alberta, California have started their transformation towards a more privatized 
market structure.  
The underlying motivation of market restructuring is the belief that the privatized 
industry is more effective than the all-regulated market to achieve economic efficiency. 
As the profit-maximizing producers would minimize the production costs and increase 
the stability of supply to compete for the market share, the liberalized electricity market 
is believed to provide stronger incentives for efficient production and delivery of 
electricity than the regulated industry. In this sense, a deregulated electricity industry 
would benefit the national economy as it not only increase the efficiency in energy supply, 
but enhances the local firms’ competitiveness in the domestic and global markets. 
While theoretically the liberalized market system promises efficiency and other 
benefits, how to achieve these benefits are still challenges to the market regulators and 
researchers. As ambitious the restructuring campaign has been, there have been few 
successes in this campaign of market deregulation. England and Wales has suffered from 
higher energy price than marginal cost1; in California extremely high electricity price 
have resulted in energy blackout throughout the whole state for weeks. In a number of 
                                                 
1 One may argue that energy generation is increasing returns to scale where marginal cost is always less 
than average cost. This argument may apply to single generation unit rather than the entire industry. This is 
because every generation unit has generating capacity, and once the limit is exceeded, more generating 
units are needed for higher supply. If the marginal cost is always lower than average cost, this market 
would be natural monopoly and the market deregulation would in fact lower market efficiency. 
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privatized markets energy is priced greatly higher than long-term marginal cost and 
exercise of market power are evidenced in most markets (Woo et al, 2003).  
As many researches have illustrated (Green & Newberry, 1992; Wolak & Patrick, 
1996; Borenstain & Bushnell, 1999; Wolfram, 1999; Wolak, 2003), the success of the 
restructuring of the electricity market depends heavily on whether the market design 
could hedge the generation companies’ market power. If the generators have market 
power and are able to raise the market price of electricity strategically, they are going to 
exhaust the benefit the liberalized electricity industry was supposed to bring along.  
Singapore electricity market has been under deregulation since mid 1990s. It is 
the first market being restructured in Asian area. In 1998, the Singapore Electricity Pool 
(SEP) was set up, and the once vertically-integrated electricity market was unbundled 
into generation, transmission, and retail sectors. From then on, the electricity has been on 
the way to further liberalization, and the commencement of the New Electricity Market of 
Singapore (NEMS) at the beginning of last year was the latest step of the process to 
introduce competition into the electricity market.  
Looking back at the performance of new energy system, there have little 
electricity price cuts in the first year that were expected by the industries and households 
(Figure 12). The Uniform Singapore Electricity Price (USEP) kept stable for most of the 
periods, but the daily average USEP occasionally soared over $350/MWh (Figure 23). 
The price spikes may partly result from the rising fuel price as the gencos have argued, 
but it remains questionable if the market is really competitive. The three biggest gencos 
have an aggregated market share of above 90% and all of them are wholly owned by a 
                                                 
2 “Introduction to the Singapore NEM”, Singapore Energy Market Authority (2003) site: www.ema.gov.sg 
3 “Introduction to the Singapore NEM”, Singapore Energy Market Authority (2003) site: www.ema.gov.sg 
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single parent company, Temasek Holdings. Individual market power exercise and joint 
collusion for artificial selling price are easily achievable under current market structure. 

































                                                 
4 Figure is from Introduction to the Singapore NEM, the Energy Market Authority, Singapore, Jan 2003. 















The objective of this thesis is to trace the sources and identify possible exercise of the 
market power by the generation companies in the Singapore New Electricity Market. It 
will try to answer the question whether the generators have exercised market power and 
incurred price fluctuations in 2003.  
The following part of this thesis has three major sections. The first section 
reviews the previous researches in this area. The second section introduces the market 
structure and relevant market rules of NEMS, and thereby it discusses the strategy the 
gencos can apply to exercise the market power. The last section is the data analysis. 
Through various methods, this study tried to identify the evidence for gencos’ use of 
market power in 2003. 
CHAPTER II 
Market Power in Literature 
2-1Market Power 
 
A firm has market power when it can raise the market price above marginal cost (Tirole, 
1988). A firm that cannot change the market price is regarded as a price taker. To 
maximize its profit, a firm with and without market power has distinct strategies. A firm 
having market power could raise the market price by withholding its output quantity or 
increasing the minimum price for which it would sell its products. On the contrary, a 
price-taking firm is willing to sell its products as long as its marginal cost is below the 
market price. Therefore, a benchmark to distinguish a firm having market power from a 
price taker is its bidding prices5. If a firm attempts to sell outputs for a price higher than 
                                                 
5 Note that sometimes whether a player can influence the market price is not necessarily an indicator of 
market power. For instance, in equity market stock price is affected by investors’ trading behavior, while 
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its marginal cost, i.e. the competitive level, it should be viewed to have used market 
power.  
The ability of a firm to change the market price depends on two critical factors: 
the demand price-elasticity and other competitors’ supply price-elasticity. Recall that the 
main strategies of a firm to exercise market power are to reduce the output or to raise the 
price. If the demand is highly elastic in price, then it would be relatively difficult for the 
firm to raise the price under market equilibrium by shifting supply curve upward, i.e. 
raising the price. On the other hand, if other competitors’ supply curve is highly price-
elastic, then a firm would find it hardly profitable to restrict its own output. This is 
because that any withheld output by one firm will be immediately replaced by the 
increasing output of other firms’, and the firm that reduced its output would end up with 
decreased profit, failing to raise the market price.  
Market power weakens market efficiency. This happens because market price 
interfered with by market power exceeds the marginal cost, while a market price at the 
competitive level has several desirable properties from the perspective of economic 
efficiency (Church & Ware, 1999). Firstly, the industry is allocatively efficient when 
social marginal benefit of the output equals to social marginal cost. Prices above the 
marginal cost due to the market power usually result in an inefficient level of output 
produced. In this situation, customers who are willing to pay the social marginal cost of 
production do not get the product. 
Moreover, a competitive-level price is cost efficient in that it ensures a minimum 
opportunity cost of the resources used. It not only requires every firm to economize its 
                                                                                                                                                 
the result may still be competitive. Nonetheless, in the context of energy market, the price-taker-has-no-
market-power notion still applies. 
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resources, but also requires the number and size distribution of firms to be such that the 
average cost for industry output is minimized. In this sense, market power is harmful to 
the economic efficiency in that it prevents the resources from being utilized optimally on 
the level of the whole market.  
2-2 Market Power in the Electricity Market 
 
The electricity market is characterized by the two critical factors frequently seen to be 
associated with market power: lack of demand elasticity and constraint of individual 
generator’s producing capacity. On one hand, the majority of users purchase electricity 
power at fixed prices, meaning few customers respond to the real-time fluctuations in the 
delivered cost of power. Such a demand-side flaw technically causes a lack of demand 
elasticity (Stoft, 2002). Another explanation of the demand-side price inelasticity is that 
the social cost of an energy outrage is so large that even a very high price of electricity 
will be accepted to avoid any energy blackout. As a result, demand for energy is very 
price inelastic. On the other hand, electricity generators’ producing capacity is 
constrained in the short term, since the facility construction takes a long time before the 
incremental capacity could meet the demand’s fluctuations. This characteristic combined 
with the electricity’s property of non-storability leads to the short-run supply-side 
constraint in capacity (Church & Ware, 1999).  
Electricity market is especially vulnerable to the exercise of market power 
because of these two characteristics. Wolak (2003) illustrates that in a real time market 
where the demand is hardly responsive to the price change, each of the five largest 
electricity generators in California has market power to raise the price substantially above 
the competitive level. By calculating the set of profit-maximizing price and quantity pairs 
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for all possible residual demand realizations that a firm may face, he demonstrates that 
the equilibrium market price, given each generator’s expected profit-maximizing strategy, 
would be higher than the marginal cost of supplying the last unit sold in the real-time 
energy market.  
Acknowledging the price-inelastic nature of electricity demand, von der Fehr and 
Harbord (1993) construct a duopoly model of competition between two major electricity 
generators in the England and Wales market. The authors argue that, featured with 
constant marginal cost and no fixed cost, firms may take advantage of the supply-side 
flaw of capacity constraint to attain market price far above the competitive level.  
Three scenarios are examined by assuming different levels of generation capacity. 
Specifically, when either of the two duopolies has capacity large enough to serve the 
whole market alone, the equilibrium would be a Bertrand equilibrium that only the most 
efficient supplier sells to the market with a price equal to the marginal cost. When the 
maximum of the two generators’ capacity is smaller than the range of the demand 
fluctuation, there would be no pure strategy equilibrium in this game and the market price 
might deviate from the marginal cost. Finally, if the maximum of the two duopolies’ 
capacity is smaller than demand with a probability of one, the equilibrium market price 
will be the maximum possible price6, which could be much higher than the competitive 
level.  
2-3 Consequence of Market Power in Electricity Market 
 
                                                 
6 The maximum possible price, as the authors indicated, is due to official regulation or generator’s 
perception that the regulation authorities would effectuate price regulation if the market price exceeds the 
maximum possible price. 
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Market power has been shown in many researches to have negative effect on economic 
efficiency, especially on cost efficiency. Most customers in the electricity markets make 
their purchases at fixed price, and thus a market power would barely harm the allocation 
efficiency in the short run. Nonetheless, a high price-cost markup will reduce cost 
efficiency. Firms could exercise market power by withholding their supply capacity by 
replacing low-cost generation units by high-cost units. As a result, production becomes 
cost inefficient in that expensive production is substituted for less expensive production 
by generators exercising market power (Wolak & Patrick, 1997; Joskow & Kahn, 2000).  
In addition, high market price resulted from market power would also adversely 
impact the long-term investment decision and the future economy development. While 
one may think that high price will attract new investment and entry into the market, these 
investment may not be efficient if motivated by high price due to market power, which 
does not indicate the demand for new investment, but the lack of efficient use of existing 
capacity (Borenstein et al, 2002). In addition, high electricity price may also distract 
investment from those electricity intensive enterprises which play a important role in 
long-term economy development.  
2-4 Measurement of Market Power in Electricity Market 
 
The traditional tools of antitrust analysis rely heavily on structural indices of one kind or 
another. In the US, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) plays a prominent role in the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) analysis of electricity mergers. 
However, theoretical analysis and empirical evidence have shown that, although seller 
concentration and market power has shown strong correlation with each other in many 
industries, for electricity market HHI index is a poor indicator of the potential or 
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existence of market power. Characterized by a market demand highly price-inelastic and 
variable, and supply capacity which is significantly constrained during short run, the 
electricity market is such a market that even a firm with very small market shares could 
still possess substantial market power and push the price away from the marginal cost 
(Kahn, 1998; Borenstein et al, 1999; Borenstein et al, 2002).  
Nevertheless, the search for alternative measurement of market power in 
electricity market has proven fruitful. Electricity industry has a long history of regulation, 
and there are much more production cost data available than that of other industries, it is 
thus possible to construct more detailed models in electricity market. Therefore, 
researchers have turned to more explicit and direct measurements of market power in this 
industry.  
Two streams of researches have been conducted to identify the market power: on 
the market’s level and on the firm’s level respectively (Borenstein et al, 2002). The 
primary focus of the market-level researches is the market price. By estimating the 
marginal cost of the electricity suppliers, this group of researches calculates the price-cost 
mark-ups and compares the market price to the competitive price estimated based on the 
production capabilities of all generators in the market. This is the general approach 
adopted by Wolfram (1999) and Borenstein et al (2002).  
On the other hand, researches on the firm’s level concentrate on the individual 
generator’s bidding strategy. The basic idea is that, as a price taker, a firm having no 
market power is unable to impact the market price by its own pricing or output strategy. 
In this case investigation on the supply decision, including the pricing and quantity 
decision, might shed some light on market power identification. This approach has been 
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used in Green & Newberry (1992), von der Fehr & Harbord (1993), Green (1996), Wolak 
& Patrick (1996, 1997), Borenstein & Bushnell (1999), Joskow & Kahn (2000), and 
Wolak (2000, 2003). 
2-5 Measuring Market Power at the Level of Market 
With application of the econometric modeling technique denoted as the “new empirical 
industrial organization” (NEIO) 7  by Bresnahan (1989), Wolfram (1999) presents an 
empirical study of market power in the British electricity industry. To calculate the price-
cost markups, she developed estimation on the marginal costs of the two major generators, 
such as direct measures of production cost. She also adopted two other approaches that 
do not rely on the cost data. Moreover, to explain the estimated market power in the 
duopoly model, the researcher examined the effects of the regulatory constraints, 
potential entry, and financial contract between generators and consumers. The results of 
all the approaches are generally consistent with the finding of her first approach that 
prices are in excess of marginal production costs. 
Borenstein, Bushnell & Wolak (2002) presented a study measuring the market 
power exercised in the California electricity market. The authors decomposed the 
wholesale electricity payments into production costs, inframarginal competitive rents, 
and payments due to generator’s market power. Estimates of the input cost and scarcity 
rent are presented using the data from June 1998 to October 2000, and price was found to 
deviate significantly from the competitive level during high-demand period while remain 
close to the competitive level during the low-demand period. The authors finally 
                                                 
7 Also discussed in Church & Ware (1999). 
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conclude that around 60 percent of increase of price in that period is due to the exercise 
of market power. 
Studies of market power are generally interested in whether the market as a whole 
is operating economically efficiently. They are less vulnerable to the arguments of 
coincidence and ignorance that might be directed at analysis of the studies on the firm’s 
level, which are basically on the price and output decision of specific generators. While 
one may argue that findings on this level are less informative about specific 
manifestations of market power, this kind of researches is effective in estimating scope 
and severity of market power (Borenstein et al, 2002).  
2-6 Measuring Market Power at the Level of Generator 
 
The fundamental methodology to analyze the market power on the firm’s level is to 
simulate the strategic behavior of firms in the market. These simulations are generally 
based on several different economic equilibrium models 8 , in which firms are 
characterized with the strategic variables and their assumptions about the behavior of 
other player in the market (Kahn, 1998; Borenstein et al, 1999).  
Green & Newbery (1992) modeled the British electricity market using the “supply 
function equilibrium” approach developed by Klemperer & Meyer (1989). In this model, 
a firm’s competing strategy is the equilibrium bid curve, i.e. a price-quantity offer. Each 
of the two players, PowerGen and National Power, was assumed to behave at a 
continuous differentiable supply function, which indicates the amount of output it would 
provide given various market price. Further simulation was performed based on the 
                                                 
8 Most studies in this area have not addressed the issue of collusion. Because economic theory of collusion 
offers little practical guidance on analysis of collusive exercise of market power, players in the market are 
ordinarily assumed to exercise market power unilaterally. 
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market clearing prices and quantities during past periods, and the authors found that there 
existed a high markup beyond marginal cost and substantial deadlosses. Moreover, it was 
suggested that increasing the number of generators would hedge the exercise of market 
power. 
Another oligopoly model broadly used is the Cournot-Nash model, in which 
generator’s main strategic variables are quantities offered to the market. Borenstein & 
Bushnell (1999) modeled the California electricity market as a static Cournot market with 
a competitive fringe. Using historical data on plant costs and capacities, the authors 
estimated the Cournot equilibria at different demand levels for a number of months in 
year 2001. For each month they calculated the Cournot equilibrium price in a few 
representative hours, and then compared to the price if all firms acted as competitive 
price takers. The result of this study indicated significant potential for market power in 
high demand hours. In addition, their study suggested that increasing the responsiveness 
of both consumers and producers of electricity to the price fluctuations would have a 
significant effect on reducing the severity of market power. 
In line with von der Fehr & Harbord (1993), Wolak & Patrick (1996) analyze the 
market rules governing the British electricity market and the market structure, and they 
point out that the two major generators have opportunities to earn revenues substantially 
above the production costs in the short run. The study show that the dominant firms could 
exercise market power and raise the market clearing price by declaring certain plants 
unavailable to supply in certain periods. Furthermore, on the basis of analysis on four 
years of actual market prices, quantities and generator bids into the market, this research 
presents various evidences suggesting existence of market power by strategic use of the 
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market rules. The article by Joskow & Kahn (2000) presented similar argument on the 
strategic exercise of market power in the California market during summer 2000 and 




New Electricity Market of Singapore9 
3-1 The Market Overview 
 
The electricity industry plays a key role in Singapore’s economy. The reliable supply of 
electricity at a competitive price would contribute substantially to local firms’ efficiency 
in serving the domestic market and to their ability to compete for the global market. This 
will in turn promote the development of Singapore’s economy. 
The electricity industry in Singapore was traditionally owned by the government 
and was vertically integrated.  The Public Utilities Board (PUB) was formed in May 1963 
and responsible for supply of electricity, water, and piped gas in Singapore.  Since mid 
1990s, Singapore government has been undertaking a series of deregulation reforms to 
enhance the market efficiency of the electricity industry. The underlying motive of the 
restructuring campaign is the belief that the privatized industry is more effective than the 
all-regulated market to achieve economic efficiency. Figure 3 present the timeline of the 
industry reform process (Chang & Tay, 2003). 
                                                 
9 This chapter relies heavily on the information from the Singapore Energy Market Authority web site: 
www.ema.gov.sg and Electricity Market Company web site: www.emcsg.com. 
 19
Figure 3   
Timeline for deregulation of the Singapore electricity industry 
 
 
1995    Singapore Power formed, October 
1998   Wholesale electricity pool commenced, April 
 1999  Government review of electricity industry, September 
 2000  Government decision on further deregulation, March 
 2001  Energy Market Authority formed, April 
   Very large consumers contestable, July 
 2003   New electricity market commencement, January 
   First and second tranche consumers contestable 
 2003/4  All consumers contestable 
 
 
The first reform of the electricity industry was in 1995. The Government corporatised the 
electricity undertakings of the Public Utility Board by transferring the electricity and gas 
functions to Singapore Power Ltd (SP), which was held under the government holding 
company, Temasek Holdings. Although SP is still owned by the government, it operated 
as a corporate entity then. On the other hand, within Temasek Holdings, Singapore Power 
was operated as the holding company for several other new companies including the 
generation companies, PowerSenoko (now known as Senoko Power) and PowerSeraya; 
the transmission company, PowerGrid; and SP Services Ltd, the electricity supply and 
utilities support service company. A further generator, Tuas Power, was set up as an 
independent company directly under Temasek Holdings. 
The second phase of the reform was implemented on 1 April 1998 when the 
Singapore Electricity Pool (SEP) commenced operation. The Pool worked as a wholesale 
electricity market to facilitate the trading of electricity between generation companies and 
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SP Services Ltd. As the companies competing in the market were almost owned by the 
government, the pool had attained many attributes of a competitive electricity market. 
Following the review in 1999, the Government decided in March 2000 to 
continue the liberalization of the electricity industry and carry out further reforms.  The 
restructuring schemes were carried out to unbundle the potential competitive retail and 
generation sectors and non-competitive elements of SP. On 1 April 2001, the Energy 
Market Authority (EMA) was established to regulate the operation of the electricity and 
gas industries. In addition, the Energy Market Company (EMC), a joint venture of the 
EMA and MCo of New Zealand, is responsible for the operation and administration of 
the wholesale electricity market.  
3-1-1 Institutional Overview of NEM 
 
The electricity market consists of a wholesale market and a retail market. The wholesale 
electricity market (WEM) provides deals with the trading of electricity-related 
commodities within a real-time market along with a bilateral contracts market. The 
wholesale market therefore deals with the relationship mainly between generation 
companies and wholesale buyers through the market operator.  In the retail market, 
intermediaries such as retailers buy from the wholesale market and sell or supply to 




                                                 
10 Figure obtained from Singapore Energy Market Authority website - www.ema.gov.sg 
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3-1-2 Key Players in the NEM 
 
The functions of key players in the New Electricity Market are discussed below. The 
EMA is the regulator of the electricity industry and it is responsible for ensuring that the 
electricity needs be met in NEM. The EMC functions as the operator and administer of 
the wholesale market. The power system operator (PSO) is a division of EMA, and is 
responsible for the reliable supply of electricity to consumers and the secure operation of 
the power system. Generation companies (Gencos) are producers of electricity, which 
provide electricity to the spot market and reserve capacity to the spinning reserve market 
respectively. Figure 5 lists the Gencos in Singapore market now.  
                                                 
11 Figure is from the official website of the Energy Market Authority, Singapore, 2003. 
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The transmission licensee, PowerGrid, owns and is responsible for the operation and 
maintenance of the transmission system. Moreover, the generation licensees are those 
dispatchable generators with capacity above 1MW. In NEM, such generators are required 
to be licensed and be registered with the EMC as market participants. In addition, the 
market support services licensees (MSSL) provide market support services such as meter 
reading and meter data management. They also provide the contestable consumers and 
retailers the access to the WEM, and are responsible for supplying electricity to the non-
contestable consumers. So far there is only one MSSL in NEM, SP Services Ltd. More 
MSSLs will entry the market later on. Furthermore, the retail electricity licensees are 
permitted to sell to contestable consumers. There are two kinds of retail electricity 
licensees: Market Participant Retailers (MPRs) and Non-Market Participant Retailers 
(NMPRs). MPRs are registered as a market participant and buy electricity directly from 
the wholesale market, while NMPRs purchase electricity through the MSSL. Finally, 
consumers are divided into contestable and non-contestable according to their electricity 
                                                 
12 Figure is from Introduction to the Singapore NEM, the Energy Market Authority, Singapore, Jan 2003. 
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needs. Contestable consumers may buy electricity from a retailer, a MSSL or directly 
from the WEM, while non-contestable consumers are required to buy from the MSSL. 
3-2 Wholesale Market Operation 
3-2-1 Dispatch of Electricity 
 
The real-time dispatch of electricity in NEMS is determined in the wholesale spot market 
every half-hour. In the process dispatches of supply of energy, reserve and regulation are 
scheduled through the wholesale market mechanism. Generation companies bid in the 
market by specifying the price/quantity pair of their supply, while the PSO estimates the 
total load of the next half hour with respect to any system constraint. The market then 
determines the least-cost dispatch quantities and the corresponding market clearing prices 
based on the generators’ offers and the expected total demand.  
The PSO instructs the generators to conform to the dispatch schedule. The 
deviations from the estimated load and the corresponding schedule will be handled by 
PSO’s ancillary services. The dispatch schedule resulted from this mechanism would 
meet that market demand at the minimum cost while taking into account of the 
transmission constraints and system conditions, regulation requirements.  
3-2-2 Reserve13 and Regulation14 Markets 
 
Because of the extreme importance of energy to the country’s economy and national 
security, Singapore has had separate reserve and regulation markets to prevent any 
                                                 
13 Reserve capacity is unused capacity that is available on a stand-by basis to supply energy in an 
emergency. Typically, this capacity must be able to be in production within a timeframe ranging from a few 
seconds to a few minutes. It is often called spinning reserve to indicate that the turbines are already 
operating and can be activated to produce energy very quickly. Interruptible load is also a form of reserve. 
 
14 Regulation is defined to be the generation capacity that is able to follow the normal variations in load 
during the half-hour dispatch period. 
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emergent energy blackout. The Singapore NEM schedules the provision of reserve and 
regulation simultaneously with the dispatch of energy based on offers made by market 
participants. Because the generation capacity available for the reserve and regulation is 
forgone in the energy production, generators are compensated by the NEM for the 
capacity they offer in the reserve and regulation markets. The spot market price for the 
regulation and reserve is determined in the same way as the price of electricity.  
3-2-3 Bilateral Contracts and Vesting Contracts 
 
In addition to trade in the real-time market, participants can trade in bilateral contracts. 
The bilateral contracts are financial arrangement, and participants buy and sell in the spot 
market and settle any financial difference implied by the bilateral contracts. Such 
contracts provide participants certainty in terms of price as well as supply and reduce 
their exposure to spot market volatility. Bilateral contracts do not affect dispatch schedule 
or price in the real-time market, although the parties may use the EMC’s settlement 
system to settle the financial differences under their contracts. Researchers have found 
bilateral contract are effective in hedging generators’ market power (Wolak, 1998).  
Vesting contracts are a form of bilateral contract imposed on generators by the 
EMA for a transitional period. According to the EMA annual report 2003/2004, the 
vesting price is set at the long-term marginal cost of the most efficient generation 
technology. Based on the current technology, this is the combined cycle gas turbine. The 
vesting allocation to the generators is in proportion to their respective installed capacity. 
The MSSL is now the counterparty to generators of all the vesting contracts, as it settles 
vesting contracts with retailers or consumers. According to the ANNUAL report, 65% of 
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demand was set at the vesting price and the remaining 35% has been opened to 
competition in the wholesale market. 
These contracts are to limit the potential of market power by large generators. 
Before vesting contracts were in function, generation companies could sell energy at the 
maximum allowable price under the price cap mechanism. Wholesale electricity price 
then remained close to the price cap. After vesting contracts was implemented, according 
to the annual report, wholesale electricity price fell by an average of 10%. The price 
decrease itself could be an indicator of market power. As with 10% lower price 
generators can still continue to operate, the original high price was definitely not lying at 
the marginal cost level.  
3-2-4 The Offer Process 
 
In WEM, generation companies offer their bids of energy, reserve, and regulation each 
half-hour. They are also required to submit their offers to supply the interruptible load 
similarly. Offers can be changed each half-hour, and are assumed to stand until 
generators make any modification. In addition, the most recent bids will be taken no 
matter they are offered during the market outlook scenarios, pre-dispatch schedule or 
real-time process. Advance indicative market outlook and pre-dispatch scenarios are 
scheduled to help with outage planning and to predict the expected prices generators and 
consumers would face. These indicative market scenarios are not binding and demand no 
financial commitment. 
There are two pre-dispatch scenarios: market outlook scenarios and pre-dispatch 
schedules. The former is re-issued seven-day rolling horizon daily, in which indicative 
dispatch schedules and prices are issued for the next week. The latter is re-issued every 
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two hours. Indicative pre-dispatch schedules and prices are issued for the current day and 
next dispatch day. These are followed by the real-time dispatch, which determines the 
real-time dispatch schedule and market. The generators are committed to their offer 
prices and quantities at this point. Figure 6 below provides a timetable of two pre-
dispatches and the real-time schedule15. 
Figure 616  Timeline of Indicative Advance Scenarios 
 
 
Every midnight the generators offer ahead for a period of seven days. Schedules and 
prices for the 7-day period are published each day. Nodal load forecasts are calculated by 
the EMC based on information provided by the PSO. These market outlook scenarios 
provide the market participants some estimation of the future market condition. Now that 
market prices are signaled well in advance, the market participants have chances to 
modify their offers and earn higher profit strategically in the real-time market. 
                                                 
15 Figure obtained from  “Introduction to the Singapore New Electricity Market”, which is posted on the 
Singapore Energy Market Authority website - www.ema.gov.sg  
16 Figure is from Introduction to the Singapore NEM, the Energy Market Authority, Singapore, Jan 2003. 
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Pre-dispatch schedules deal with the estimation of market outcome in the current 
day and the next day. It looks ahead with a maximum of 36 hours and a minimum of 12 
hours. Any offer made for a dispatch period will be assumed to be binding until 
superseded by a later offer for the same dispatch period. Several load scenarios are 
prepared according to different forecasts from low to high estimation (normal, medium, 
and low) of the load of the day.  
There is a firm gate closure after which any changes in offers will not be accepted 
by the market operator’s system. There is also an earlier effective gate closure after 
which any change in offers, although accepted by the system, will be presented to the 
market surveillance investigation. The firm gate closure states that offer variation data for 
a dispatch period must be submitted no less than five minutes before the dispatch period. 
Besides, although it is not formally ruled, the last time to change offers is two hours 
before the beginning of the dispatch period. Any changes in offers submitted within two 
hours before the dispatch period will be subject to the market surveillance panel for 
investigation.  
Several key features of the generator offer process are discussed below. First of 
all, generators are required to submit their standing offers in the form for a week. Such a 
regulation is supposed to reduce the administrative costs of the generators and the market 
operator. Second, market participants are allowed to continually adjust their offers up to 
the gate closure. Furthermore, generation companies can offer their energy in up to 10 
price/quantity tranches for each facility for each half-hour, and generators and 
interruptible load may make reserve offers up to 5 price/reserve and regulation quantity 
bands. Moreover, energy, reserve, and regulation are all offered at the same time, and 
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will be co-optimized by the MCE. Finally, energy offers for each generation facility are 
made at the node where the facility is.  
 
3-2-5 Dispatch Schedule in the Spot Market 
 
The following section will discuss the price determining process in the real time 
electricity market. Every half of an hour a computer model, the MCE17, is run to 
determine the dispatch schedule and the prices for energy, reserve, and regulation 
respectively. The dispatch scheduling goes as the generators offer their bid of 
price/quantities pair and the PSO forecast the estimation of demand in the next dispatch 
period. On the basis of the data of supply and demand, the model runs to find a set of 
dispatch schedule that minimizes the cost of supplying the total load in that period and 
that meets the requirement of reserve and regulation and other system constraint.  
This pricing mechanism is called the minimum cost market dispatch. Figure 7 
presents a simple example. Suppose there are two generators, A & B competing in the 
WEM, while each of them has 4 price/energy quantity bands. To find out the least-cost 
dispatch and the market clearing price, the MCE starts with arranging the offers in 
ascending price order and whereby depicts what’s denoted in economics as the market 
supply curve. Furthermore, it constructs a total demand curve using a forecast of the load 
in that period.  
The dispatch schedule and the market clearing price are determined at the 
intersection of the supply curve and the demand curve. In this case, the market clearing 
price is $90/MWh, and quantities of energy each generation unit is dispatched are 
                                                 
17 The MCE is a linear programming model. It solves linear simultaneous equations to find the solution that 
best meets some criterion or “objective”. 
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scheduled simultaneously. That is, offers below the market clearing price are accepted 
and those generation units are dispatched. Offers above the market clearing price are not 
accepted, and those generation units are not dispatched. At the margin, the offer that sets 
the price is usually partially dispatched (like in this case).  
 
Figure 7   
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The real-time market runs in advance of the dispatch period and determine the market 
price before the energy trades happen. Therefore, due to the real time load’s deviation 
from the estimation and changes of generators’ provision, the outcome in the dispatch 
period may not be exactly the one that is depicted by MCE in advance. However, 
generators and load face the ex ante market prices regardless of the real time outcome. 
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Such a dispatch is considered efficient in economic terms. Generation units are 
dispatch when the prices of their offers are below the market clear price, and they earn a 
profit equal to the difference between their offers and the market price, or in economics, 
the producer’s surplus. Those generation units whose prices are higher than the market 
clear price are not dispatched since they are not efficient enough to serve the market. 
However, as discussed in the following section, there still exist flaws in market design 
that would lead to possible exercise of market power by generators. 
3-2-6 Determination of Real-Time Market Prices 
 
The market clearing price calculated by the MCE in NEMS is called market energy price 
(MEP). It may vary at different market network nodes18. Therefore, the market energy 
price for a particular market network node for a dispatch period is called nodal energy 
price. There are approximately 35 market network nodes in Singapore. While the nodal 
market prices are of interest primarily to generator, the consumers in the spot market will 
buy energy for wholesale electricity price. The wholesale electricity price is calculated as 
the summation of USEP and other institutional payments and administrative fees (such as 
EMC & PSO fees), where USEP is the uniform purchase price paid by retailers, and it is 
calculated as a weighted average of all the nodal market prices in Singapore’s network.  
3-3 Important Features of NEMS 
 
In this section four important features of NEMS are discussed. These features may 
potentially render the generators the ability to exercise market power and artificially raise 
                                                 
18 Node is any of the injection or exit points on the transmission system in the market model.  
 31
the real-time energy prices. These four features can be categorized into on the supply side 
and on the demand side.  
On the supply side, capacities of the generators are limited and generators in 
NEMS usually own mixed generation units with diverse capacities. On the demand side, 
so most consumers buy energy for fixed prices stated in the vesting contract and thus 
their responsiveness to the price violation is marginal. Moreover, the market clearing 
price in the real-time market is determined on the basis of estimation of load, which in 
some sense, is irrelevant to the real-time demand of energy. 
A key feature of the electricity industry is the supply constraint of generators. 
Every producer has an upper bound in terms of the energy it can bid to offer into the 
market during each dispatch period. Furthermore, there are also transmission constraints 
as far as transmitting energy between different nodes is concerned. Both constraints 
contribute to the supply’s price inelasticity for a particular node in a load period. As von 
der Fehr and Harbord (1993) argued, when the generators expect that the total load will 
be rather large compared to the generation capacities, they will be better off by pricing 
around the competitive level, otherwise they may lose the market to bidders asking for 
lower prices. 
Another supply-side problem which may be used by generators to exercise market 
power is the diverse mix of generating capacity owned by particular generators. Gas-fired 
combined cycle plants (CCP) and oil-fired steam turbo (ST) are the two major generation 
units of Singapore’s electricity producers. As the names suggest, CCP mainly burn 
natural gas to generate electricity while ST burn fuel oil. CCPs are used as the base-load 
units since they cost relatively low, and ST are the peak-load unit which cost much higher. 
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As a study by Chang & Tay (2003) suggests, the biggest three gencos in NEMS have the 
following mixes of generation units. 37.88% of generation capacity of Senoko Power is 
ST and 60.69% is CCP. 70.26% of PowerSeraya’s capacity is ST and 23.35% is CCP. 
44.94% of Tuas Power’s capacity is ST and 27.49% is CCP. There are still other kinds of 
generation plants, including Cogeneration Plants, Gas Turbo, and Incineration Plants, 
which compose 17.4% installed generation capacity in the market 19 . This mix of 
generation capacity possessed by the generators yields gencos slightly increasing 
marginal cost curves, and it provides opportunity for generation companies to earn high 
profit by strategically withholding certain low-cost capacities. As a result, the real-time 
market will end up with a higher market clearing price, and gencos will obtain larger 
profit if the revenue by selling the capacity withheld is less than the extra revenue 
resulted from the higher price.  
As well as the supply-side features, the demand-side features are also found 
vulnerable to market power. As discussed, the total demand in WEM is inelastic to the 
real-time price in that a lot of energy trades are in the form of vesting contract and 
bilateral contract. Moreover, the MCE derives the market clearing price from the 
estimation of load in the coming dispatch period, which also leads to a market price 
irresponsive to the real demand. Figure 8 plots the variations of the Uniform Singapore 
Electricity Price (USEP) and the system demand in 2003. The behavior of USEP is 
notably different from that of the demand, as the former presents tremendous variability 
even during a short time period while the latter exhibits far less volatility during the 
whole year. Given such a price-inelastic demand, generators in the real time market 
                                                 
19 Information drawn from Energy Market Authority site: www.ema.gov.sg, “Quarterly Electricity and Gas 
Statistics: 2003Q3” and “Existing Installed Capacity of Generation Licensees”. 
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sometimes, especially during peak hours, can bid far less aggressively bearing no risk of 
being replaced by the rivals.  



















Model of This Study 
 
As mentioned above, producers have two strategies to exercise market power. They can 
either price their supply high, or they can withdraw a portion of output to achieve a 
higher clearing price. Due to the energy market’s special features, i.e. lack of demand 
price-elasticity and supply constraint, these two strategies would have substantial 
influence on the market outcome if there were no relevant regulating actions. However, 
as the electricity industry has a long history of governmental supervision, generation 
costs are relatively easy to assess and compute (von der Fehr & Harbord, 1993; Wolfram, 
1999). In this sense, the first strategy, bidding substantially above the marginal cost, 
                                                 
20 Figure is from Introduction to the Singapore NEM, the Energy Market Authority, Singapore, Jan 2003. 
 34
    
 
 
would be easily detected and expose the generators themselves to the danger of 
regulation penalty (Wolak & Patrick, 1996). 
Figure 9  
Impact of Producer’s Withholding Strategy on Market Price 
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Withdrawing generation capacity turns out to be a better strategy for generators. To 
understand this, note supply curve gets steeper when the level of output increases. When 
generator is producing toward the upper bound of its capacity constraint, cost of energy 
supply rises sharply. Therefore, the gencos could substantially raise the price by shutting 
down part of their generation capacity, especially the low-cost generation units. Figure 9 
shows the market outcome under the capacity withholding strategy. 
When Generator A and Generator B compete without withholding capacity in the 
wholesale market (the first figure), the market clearing price is $90/MWh. In particular, 
the demand curve meets Genco B’s offer of $90/MWh-300MW, and the intersection 
determines the dispatch schedule, where Generator A will produce  740MW ( = 250MW 
+ 490MW) and Generator B will produce 730MW( = 300MW + 280MW + 150MW).  
Now consider the market outcome when gencos withhold some low-cost capacity. 
The second figure depicts such a situation. Suppose Genco A declares that its 250MW 
unit would be unavailable for generation in the dispatch period and it has been replaced 
by another unit which will supply 280MW at a much higher price. As a result, the market 
is cleared at the intersection of the demand curve and Genco A’s offer of $130/MWh-
160MW. Now the market price is $130/MWh, as Genco A will generate 590MW 
(=490MW+100MW) and Genco B will generate 880 MW (=300MW+280MW+300MW). 
Such a change in generation capacity will create higher profit to the generator who has 
withheld capacity normally and other generators almost in any cases. In this example, 
both generators benefit from the shut-down of the low-cost generation unit. The changes 
in both gencos’ profit are calculated below: 
 
Genco A: 100,10$)740*/90($)590*/130($ =−=Δ MWhMWhMWhMWhprofit  
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Genco B: 00,487$)730*/90($)880*/130($ =−=Δ MWhMWhMWhMWhprofit  
 
 
By this means, generators can substantially raise their profit by withholding the 
low-cost capacity strategically. This strategy is more effective and more feasible than the 
bidding-high strategy. Moreover, the market clearing price is based on the estimated 
system demand, and the generators are bidding having known where the “demand curve” 
is probably going to be. As a result, it is much easier to obtain higher market price by 
declaring some generation capacity unavailable strategically, in other words, to ensure 
that the demand curve crosses the supply curve at the steeper part. In addition, this 
strategy is much more difficult to detect than the bidding-high strategy. Capacity declared 
unavailable could be the result of unpredictable generation outage, plant’s routine 
maintenance, or strategic withholding. It’s very difficult, if possible, to distinguish off-
line capacity due to exercise of market power from that due to purely technical problems. 
In an effort to assess whether generation companies have exercised market power, 
this study models the generators to compete using output strategy. In line with the 
oligopoly competition model by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), I compared the market 
outcome and generators’ output decision across 3 demand regimes.  
In the first regime, market demand can be satisfied by any single generator, and 
generators bid aggressively for customer. In the second regime, demand increases and all 
generators must participate in the market. Price deviates from marginal cost and 
generators can make profit much higher than the competitive level. Finally, when the 
demand is between the first and the second regime, gencos’ bidding strategy is 
complicated due to two opposite incentives. On one hand, generators with a positive 
possibility to participate in the market are always attempted to increase the selling price 
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(and make the high-cost unit be dispatched, in this case). On the other hand, generators 
also have an incentive to bid low and undercut their rivals. By this means, the possibility 
to be called into operation is increased and the expected profit goes up. As a result of 





Data in this study includes USEP21, system demand, and CCP/ST generation in every 
dispatch period in 2003. There are 17520 observations in total in the data base. Each 
observation consists of the USEP, the system demand, and the CCP/ST components in 
one dispatch period. In addition, information from the Energy Market Authority and 
Energy Market Company’s publications is also broadly used. These publications include 
“Introduction to Singapore’s NEM” (EMA, 2003) and “Wholesale Electricity Market 
Report 2003” (EMC 2004). 
5-1 About the Market 
There are five generation companies in Singapore energy market. As shown in Figure 10, 
the biggest three gencos have both CCP generation plant and ST generation plant. The 
fourth biggest genco, Sembcorp Cogen has one generation unit. Other gencos either have 
no capacity running currently or is not operating commercially. Based on scheduled 
generation in 2003, PowerSeraya’s has a market share of 30.41%, Senoko Power has a 
                                                 
21 Uniform Singapore Energy Price (USEP) is the quantity weighted average of prices at withdrawl nodes 
across Singapore in a particular trading period. 
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market share of 30.22%, Tuas Power has a market share of 23.50%, and SembCorp 
Cogen has a market share of 12.97%. Figure 11 shows the detailed energy market share.  






































                                                 
22 Figure is from Introduction to the Singapore NEM, the Energy Market Authority, Singapore, Jan 2003. 






The HHI index of this market is 2566.897, which according to the standards of the US 
Department of Justice indicates a highly concentrated marketplace. The more 
concentrated the market is, the more likely the companies are to exert market power. 
(Nevertheless, a small HHI does not indicate low potential for market power. As 
discussed before, a small company can raise the market price dramatically due the special 
features of energy market.) Given their significant presence in this market, gencos in this 
market could manipulate the market unilaterally. Moreover, it remains unclear whether 
the Big Three, owned by the same parent company, Temasek Holding, have had collusive 
market behavior. Therefore, it is highly doubtful if the market is operating competitively 
and the market structure and market rule have effectively hedged the genco’s exercise of 
market power in 2003. 
5-2 USEP & System Demand in 2003 
 
Figure 12 shows the USEP and system demand in 2003. There were a number of price 
spikes during 2003, three of which reached the $4500/MWh price cap. There were also 
periods of consistent high price, one of which happened from mid February to mid March 
(area A), the other from mid October to mid November (area B).  
According to Energy Market Company’s annual report (EMC, 2003), the higher 
prices in area A were caused by increases in system demand after the Chinese New Year 
holiday period and lower generation availability due to planned plant outrages. There 
were also influences from the reserve market. The system reserve requirement was said to 
be higher during this period and had to some extent pushed up the price in real-time 
market.  
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On one hand, the generation availability decreased due to planned plant outrages. On the 
other hand, Gas supply from the West Natuna field in Indonesia was disrupted on 15 
November and partically restored on 19 November. During that period, CCP capacity 
was either not offered into the market or was offered in at higher prices reflecting the cost 
of switching to diesel as an alternative fuel source. 
Higher prices in area B are believed to result from lower generation supply. 
Figure 13 shows the dynamics of USEP and generation availability in 2003. The daily 
generation availability was generally between 7,500MW and 8,500MW throughout the 
whole year. There are two areas where the generation availability stayed under 7,500MW. 
One of the low-generation-availability periods happened from mid February to mid 
March, while the other happened from mid October to mid November. These two periods 
are the two very periods when the USEP arises to a higher than average level, marked as 
                                                 
24 Figure is from Wholesale Electricity Market Report 2003, the Energy Market Company, Singapore, 2004. 
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area A and area B in figure 11. In this case, EMC’s claim that the high prices in these two 
areas were partially caused by plant outrages is supported. 















The price spikes in May, August, and December, reported in EMC’s annual report, were 
caused by either unplanned plant outrages or insufficient generation offers. This 
coincides with the result of a comparison between system demand and generation supply. 
On August 14th 2003, the USEP reached the price cap or $4500/MWh twice. In the 29th 
dispatch period of that day, the aggregation of CCP and ST generation was lower than 
system demand by 97.66MW, with comparison to the fact that except in that dispatch 
period, the aggregation of CCP and ST generation has always been slightly higher than 
system demand throughout the 17520 dispatch periods of the whole year. 
The reasons for price spikes and price increases on particular periods are difficult 
to verify due to the complicated nature of electricity generation market. As discussed 
before, it is extremely difficult for market regulator to discover if the unavailability of 
                                                 
25 Figure is from Wholesale Electricity Market Report 2003, the Energy Market Company, Singapore, 2004. 
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generation capacity was caused by regular plant maintenance or strategic capacity 
shutdown. In this case, we can only trace the evidence of market power by looking into 
the market performance during a long period and trying to find out potential evidence 
through the time-series features of market participants’ activities. 
5-3 Evidence of Withholding Strategy 
 
The first piece of evidence comes from comparing generators’ bidding behaviors at 
different level of market demands. In line with the theory introduced by von der Fehr and 
Harbord (1993), gencos’ bidding behavior varies when the market demand changes. 
When market demand is lower than any of the generator’s capacity, gencos bid 
aggressively to compete for the market. When demand is so large that every genco is 
significant in the market, gencos can make a profit much higher than the competitive 
level with bids deviated from marginal cost function. When the demand is between the 
first and second level described above, gencos’ bidding strategy is complicated by two 
opposite forces that only mixed-strategy equilibrium sustains. 
In order to examine whether energy generators have followed the strategy 
described by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), this study examined the variation of 
market clearing price, the USEP, across different levels of market demand. The 
underlying rational is that the market clearing price is the result of market competition, 
and it reflects the collective outcome of generators’ bidding behaviors. To that end, 
market demand is separated into five regimes, ranging from below 3,000MW to above 
4,800MW with an interval of 600MW. 
Figure 14 provides a brief description of the dynamics of demand in 2003. As 
shown in the figure, the system demand seldom went below 3000MW throughout the 
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year. The biggest three generators’ capacity are 3300MW, 3100MW, and 2670MW 
respectively. Other gencos have only one type of generation plant, and they cannot raise 
profit using the withholding strategy. Therefore, the first regime is set under MW3000 as 
any one of the three biggest gencos can serve almost the entire market.  




















Other regimes are set increasingly from 3000MW with 600MW increments. The 
maximum system demand in the whole year, as shown in figure 13, was slightly below 
5000MW. In these regimes, at least two of three biggest gencos should supply the market 
simultaneously, while none of the three gencos is significant in terms of their participance.  
Demand has never been at a level where all the gencos have to participate in order 
to satisfy the entire market. Given the total amount of installed generation capacity 
(10,286MW, Figure 10), the entire market demand could be met even if the demand 
doubled the maximum amount it has ever been so far.  
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The USEP across the five regimes are summarized in Table 1. For each demand 
regime, the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum of USEP are listed down. 
The mean value of USEP increases successively from the first to the fifth regime, and the 
standard deviation of USEP also gets higher as the demand increases. Moreover, the 
volatility of USEP, indicated by the ratio of the standard deviation, also demonstrates a 
consistent increasing trend from the lower regimes to the higher ones.  
Table 1  Summary of USEP in System Demand Regimes 
Regime USEP Mean Std. Dev. S.D./Mean 
1 Demand<=3000 64.86 16.28 0.25 
2 3000<Demand<=3600 79.07 34.80 0.44 
3 3600<Demand<=4200 89.14 40.14 0.45 
4 4200<Demand<=4800 108.87 113.55 1.043 
5 Demand>4800 152.21 391.83 2.57 
 
Note the most significant increase of the standard deviation of USEP takes place from the 
forth regime to the fifth regime. Such an increase is 4 times as much as that from the third 
regime to the forth regime, 52 times the increase from the second to the third regime and 
15 times as much as the increase from the first to the second regime. The minimum 
increase of standard deviation of USEP is from the second to the third regime. 
The most significant increase of the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of 
USEP is from the forth to the fifth regime as well. It is 2.6 times as much as the increase 
from the third to the forth regime, 150 times the increase from the second to the third 
regime and 8 times the increase from the first to the second regime. The minimum 
increase of this ratio also takes place from the second to the third regime. 
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The following is a plausible interpretation of Table 1. In the first regime where 
only one of the three biggest gencos can supply the whole market, both the mean and the 
standard deviation of USEP are at the lowest level. This is consistent with von der Fehr 
and Harbord’s (1993) theory that when the system demand is very low, gencos will 
compete very aggressively for market share. Therefore, the market price turned out to be 
relatively low. Furthermore, the lowest standard deviation indicates that when demand 
was very low, all gencos bid under a pure strategy in terms of price and capacity 
availability, which is also in line with von der Fehr and Harbord’s (1993) theory that 
there will be only pure strategy equilibrium when the market demand can be satisfied by 
a single company. 
The increasing standard deviation of USEP in the successive regimes indicates 
that as the increase in market demand has added more complication into generators’ 
bidding strategy. On one hand, gencos are tempted to withhold some of low-cost capacity 
in order to raise the market price. This is because when the market demand is increasing, 
they are less likely to get undercut by other competitors. On the other hand, there are still 
chances that high bidders get kicked out of the game if their prices are set too high. They 
have to use the capacity withholding strategy cautiously. The standard deviation and ratio 
of standard deviation to mean of USEP are both found to be at the highest level in the 
fifth regime, indicating the attempt to manipulate the market price amplified as demand 
increased.  
An interesting finding in Table 1 is that the volatility of USEP (presented as 
Standard Deviation/Mean) does not change much from regime 2 to regime 3. On the 
contrary, it increases dramatically from regime 3 to regime 4 and from regime 4 to 
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regime 5. This dramatic increase can probably be explained by the composition of 
gencos’ generation plants. As shown in Figure 10, the total CCP capacity of the three 
biggest gencos is around 4200MW. In this case it makes great difference in terms of 
gencos’ bidding strategy if the system demand is higher than 4200MW or not. If the 
demand is lower than 4200MW where the entire market demand can be supplied by all 
the gencos’ low-cost capacity, a genco is highly likely to be undercut by other gencos if it 
replaces some of its low-cost units (CCPs) by high-cost units (STs) and asks for higher 
price. Therefore, the volatility of the USEP is generally consistent when demand is 
between 3000MW and 4200 MW, while it shoots up as the demand exceeds 4200MW. 
Furthermore, the total CCP capacity in this market is around 4800MW. As a result, the 
volatility of USEP increases significantly again as the demand exceeds 4800MW under 
the same logic.  
In order to capture further details on generators’ bidding behavior, this study takes 
a closer look at market dynamics in both peak load period and low load period. 
Interpretation of the difference in market price between the two periods is discussed to 
provide evidence of capacity withholding. The period from Jan 30, 2003 to Feb 24, 2003 
is one of the off-peak load periods, and the period from May 19 to June 13 is one of the 
peak load periods. There are 33 days in both sample periods.  
In off-peak period, bins of system demand are formed from the lowest demand 
level (2535MW) with an increment of 100MW to the highest demand level (4735MW). 
The same type of bins are formed for peak load period, where demand ranges from 
3149MW to 4949 MW. I thereby calculate the minimum, mean, maximum, and standard 
deviation of USEP in each bin. I also calculated the minimum, mean, and maximum of 
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CCP capacity used in each bin. The result of the calculation is shown in Table 2 and 
Table 3 in Appendix. 
Figure 15 compares the standard deviation of USEP in off-peak load period and 
peak load period. The X-axis is the sequence of the demand bin, while the red and blue 
curves demonstrate the standard deviation in different bins respectively.  













As shown in the figure, the red curve starts to increase suddenly at around bin #12 and 
bin #17, where system demand varies from 4149MW to 4249MW and from 4649MW to 
4749MW respectively. This result are broadly consistent with that of the analysis on all 
the dispatch periods, which shows a dramatic increase of volatility of USEP when the 
system demand increase from below to above 4200MW and from below to above 
4800MW. The argument is again supporting that gencos were more motivated to bid 
strategically and manipulate the market price when the system demand is high. 
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The above argument can be further strengthened by comparing the compositions 
of generation units at different level of system demand. To make this comparison, I select 
bins of system demand from 2535MW to 4935MW increasing in an increment of 
100MW. I thereby calculate the means of CCP and ST generation capacity for different 
bins.  






















Figure 16 shows the result of the calculation. The X-axis is the system demand, and the 
blue and red curve demonstrate the fitted value of mean of CCP generation and ST 
generation respectively. As shown in the figure, both CCP generation and ST generation 
increased as the demand went up. However, the slope of the red curve is apparently larger 
than the blue curve across all demand level, especially when the demand was very high. 
Such a result indicates that, for every megawatt of increase in demand, there is more 
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increase in high-cost generation than in low-cost generation (CCP). This may suggests 
that generators tend to stop using low-cost generation capacity to raise the market price 
when the market demand become high, although the total capacity of CCP generation can 
actually satisfy the entire market demand even when demand reached its summit in 2003. 
Figure 17 and 18 compares the CCP generation capacity between off-peak load 
period and peak load period calculated in Table 2 and 3. The X-axis in the figures is 
system demand. The blue, red, and green curves demonstrate the fitted value of the 
minimum, mean, and maximum of CCP generation respectively.  






















As shown in Figure 17, the gaps between the minimum, mean, and maximum of CCP 
generation are at the lowest level when the demand is at its lowest level. As the demand 
increases, both gaps are widened. This dynamic of generation composition indicates a 
more frequent usage of CCP when the demand is low. As the demand became higher, the 
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usage of CCP generation became more volatile. This result coincides with above 
argument that high market demand has complicated gencos’ bidding behaviors. 
 






















Another interesting finding on these two figures is that the slopes of curves in Figure 17 
are generally higher than those in Figure 18. Such a difference indicates that usage of 
low-cost generation increased more steadily in the peak demand season than in the off-
peak demand season. This may also indicate a tendency to withhold low-cost capacity 
when demand is high.  
To illustrate that the USEP is frequently set substantially in excess of short-run 
marginal cost, the following exercise is performed. Bins of system demand are selected 
from 2535MW to 5000MW with an increment of 100MW. For each bin I compute the 
minimum, maximum, and mean values of USEP. The result of the calculation is 
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presented in Table 4. The minimum, maximum and mean value of USEP are plot as 
functions of system demand in Figure 19 and 20. The A-axis is the system demand, and 
the blue, red, and green curves reflect the dynamics of the minimum, mean, and 
maximum value of USEP respectively. 





















The most notable finding from these figures is that USEP varied in a wide range in all 
demand level. As the demand goes higher, the range becomes wider. Such a phenomenon 
is consistent with my previous argument that the strategy to artificially manipulate the 
market price is easier to implement and therefore generators’ bidding strategy is more 
complicated in peak demand period than in the low demand period.  
Another interesting finding is as follows. As shown in Figure 19, the three curves 
remain close to each other as the demand is lower than 3000MW. On the contrary, the 
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gaps between them widen notably after the demand exceeds 3000MW. As the demand 
increases, the green curve deviates farther from the other two curves.  
 





















In addition, the min and mean value of USEP appear to approximate each other in Figure 
19. To illustrate the difference of these two, I plot another Figure 20 to take a closer look 
at their variation. In this figure the mean value of USEP is found to adhere to the min, 
which is considered the marginal supply cost in short term, at most system demand levels. 
However, there is a sudden increase in the gap between the mean and the marginal cost 
when the demand approaches the peak. These changes are more clearly demonstrated in 
Figure 21 and 22, where the mean, min, and max of USEP are plot by their fitted value.  
Another approach to check if the market price was at the competitive level is to 
assume the minimum USEP to be the upper bound of the market’s short term marginal 
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cost. Based on this assumption, I found that both the mean and the maximum of USEP 
had substantially deviated from the marginal cost throughout the year. The level of the 
deviation increased significantly when the demand went up. 
Figure 21 






















Recall that noncompetitive profit in electricity market is technically difficult to achieve 
through purely asking for high price. As this market has a long history of regulation, 
generators’ market power is easily detected if they bid for price in great excess of 
marginal generation cost. In this case, the high market price was probably achieved 
through withholding low-cost generation unit rather than through asking for 
noncompetitive price. The dynamics of USEP in Figure 18 to 21 suggest that withholding 
strategy is most convenient to implement when demand neared its summit, as more high-
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cost capacity would be called on line and more low-cost capacity would be withheld from 
service.  
Figure 22 



























This study has discussed a mechanism where generation companies in NEMS could 
exercise market power by strategically withholding capacity. The analysis developed 
under an oligopoly equilibrium model and it suggested that by taking advantage of the 
market rules and structure, generators could manipulate the market price and achieve 
noncompetitive profit by withholding their low-cost generation capacity strategically. 
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Due to the demand’s inelasticity to price and other suppliers’ capacity constraint, it is 
rather feasible for suppliers to use this strategy in wholesale electricity market. 
In order to test this theory, the USEP and generation composition in 2003 was 
analyzed to trace the evidence of exercise of withholding strategy. Through investigation 
from various angles, this study has found a variety of evidence supportive to the 
proposition that market power had been exercised.  
As a starter, this study tested how market price, the USEP varied as system 
demand increased. As the outcome of market competition, USEP illustrates the collective 
characteristic of generators’ bidding strategy during each dispatch period. In all tests the 
USEP was found to vary more significantly when the demand became higher. Such a 
tendency to bid above competitive level suggests generators’ market power was more 
extensively exercised when the demand grew higher. In addition, dramatic changes in 
USEP’s standard deviation were found in a number of demand regimes. After analyzing 
the CCP and ST capacity composition, this study found that these changes to further 
support the proposition that gencos were more attempted to use the withholding strategy 
at high demand periods.  
This study also analyzed the usage of CCP and ST generation capacity during 
different dispatch periods. The result indicated that as demand increased, the usage of 
low-cost generation increased more slowly than the usage of high-cost generation. 
Furthermore, as the demand became higher, the usage of low-cost generation capacity 
became more volatile the high-cost generation capacity. This may also suggest that 
generators tended to meet a higher proportion of demand with high-cost generation 
capacity than low-cost capacity as demand increased.  
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For more evidence of market power, this study also plotted the minimum, 
maximum, and mean value of USEP for different demand bins through all the dispatch 
periods. To illustrate how USEP varied from the competitive price, I assumed the 
minimum of USEP to be the upper bound of short-term marginal cost. In this case, the 
mean and maximum of USEP were both found to have deviated from the short-term 
marginal cost in most dispatch periods, and the deviation went up as demand became 
high. These findings are also in line with my proposition that market power has been 
exercised and it was more frequently exercised when demand grew higher. 
The findings in this study suggest that generators have exercised market power in 
Singapore’s NEM during its first year of operation. The market’s performance sometimes 
failed to achieve the competitive efficiency due to the generators’ withholding strategy. 
However, there are still limitations in this study. The most significant one is that although 
we have found many evidences from the dynamics of USEP and generation composition 
at different demand level, no evidence has been able to prove the exercise of withholding 
strategy definitely. There is always room for argument for unexpected outrage or 
scheduled maintenance. On the other hand, given the substantial variance of USEP, the 
corresponding dynamics of generation composition, and the huge amount of profit easily 
earned through this strategy, it is difficult to believe that gencos in NEMS have not had in 
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Table 2  Summary of USEP and CCP Generation in Off-Peak Load Period 
 
SEQ OSYSDMD OUMean OUSD OUMin OUMax OCMean OCMin OCMax 
1 2535-2635 61.81 22.58 2.24 89.62 1893.80 1791.05 1955.99 
2 2635-2735 51.53 29.63 0.04 84.14 1913.87 1781.74 2018.99 
3 2735-2835 70.49 5.28 63.84 87.5 1955.37 1826.16 2104.28 
4 2835-2935 72.92 5.67 64.85 95.75 1984.25 1821.74 2208.65 
5 2935-3035 75.58 8.74 64.01 101.38 2060.27 1800.42 2272.66 
6 3035-3135 77.51 9.97 64.01 105.8 2112.28 1811.32 2310.85 
7 3135-3235 79.68 11.65 65.05 116.19 2155.50 1865.31 2427.43 
8 3235-3335 82.89 12.48 68.59 120.95 2170.57 1846.59 2477.41 
9 3335-3435 83.58 13.86 68.83 121.24 2212.31 1935.89 2492.15 
10 3435-3535 89.06 17.00 66.71 121.13 2227.96 2024 2496.73 
11 3535-3635 88.38 16.37 69.58 121.19 2255.58 2140.16 2463 
12 3635-3735 90.03 15.93 69.93 134.92 2300.59 2143.15 2463 
13 3735-3835 91.22 14.90 70.75 120.95 2314.99 2136.58 2501 
14 3835-3935 87.47 13.28 70.52 121.26 2308.80 2130.93 2567 
15 3935-4035 91.51 15.04 70.37 141.1 2371.27 2144 2589 
16 4035-4135 95.15 15.58 70.53 141.36 2445.18 2220 2621.15 
17 4135-4235 98.14 16.92 70.46 142.3 2443.36 2262.37 2631 
18 4235-4335 94.03 12.06 70.7 111.14 2467.98 2309 2672 
19 4335-4435 93.76 10.29 70.72 110.7 2491.29 2327 2693.41 
20 4435-4535 113.45 14.73 83.86 147.74 2497.21 2298 2697 
21 4535-4635 134.63 23.58 99.15 187.79 2509.02 2298 2740.19 
22 4635-4735 174.52 19.07 152.16 199.48 2545.01 2404.33 2673.47 
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Table 3  Summary of USEP and CCP Generation in Peak Load Period 
 
SEQ PSYSDMD PUmean PUSD PUMin PUMax PCMean PCMin PCMax 
1 3149-3249 73.56 1.02 71.51 75.28 2152.20 1760 2385 
2 3249-3349 75.19 0.68 73.19 76.45 2036.19 1792.25 2415 
3 3349-3449 77.48 2.94 72.92 82.48 2240.07 1860.34 2453.47 
4 3449-3549 82.39 4.88 72.94 92.86 2259.43 1821.94 2543 
5 3549-3649 85.33 5.66 72.91 95.93 2299.14 1802 2629.12 
6 3649-3749 89.22 6.44 74.45 110.05 2354.03 1802 2661.1 
7 3749-3849 89.43 7.45 74.5 119.12 2379.32 1915 2704.01 
8 3849-3949 88.10 6.23 75.07 104.88 2351.60 1972.55 2723.02 
9 3949-4049 89.72 6.02 75.87 100.86 2469.32 1995.84 2731 
10 4049-4149 89.35 5.43 75.52 104.67 2423.55 2108 2710.6 
11 4149-4249 88.25 6.13 75.99 107.93 2464.44 2293.1 2727 
12 4249-4349 102.94 61.35 76.9 359.92 2469.06 2231 2762 
13 4349-4449 99.51 47.08 76.91 358.89 2490.58 2329 2762 
14 4449-4549 101.09 34.90 81.61 348.87 2575.82 2360.04 2804.87 
15 4549-4649 97.26 19.49 86.42 208.9 2640.91 2348 2871 
16 4649-4749 95.34 3.08 90.82 108.56 2680.71 2372 2858 
17 4749-4849 101.79 21.43 89.04 298.15 2646.38 2384 2889 
18 4849-4949 151.50 382.15 89.24 3693.84 2650.08 2386 2900.5 





Table 4  Summary of USEP in 2003 
 
SEQ SystDmd UMean USD UMIN UMAX 
1 2535-2635 61.81 22.58 2 89.62 
2 2635-2735 51.53 29.63 0 84.14 
3 2735-2835 70.12 5.51 61 87.50 
4 2835-2935 63.37 17.70 0 95.75 
5 2935-3035 68.60 10.96 0 101.38 
6 3035-3135 72.20 15.12 -5 423.97 
7 3135-3235 76.04 40.78 -5 1095.40 
8 3235-3335 78.73 34.80 56 1239.33 
9 3335-3435 81.33 56.17 61 1904.56 
10 3435-3535 82.51 10.49 61 191.51 
11 3535-3635 84.76 22.10 62 605.06 
12 3635-3735 87.19 43.50 66 1312.60 
13 3735-3835 89.17 46.89 68 1312.70 
14 3835-3935 90.13 66.99 68 1721.50 
15 3935-4035 89.66 19.78 68 213.71 
16 4035-4135 91.33 18.52 68 209.03 
17 4135-4235 92.88 18.08 69 208.44 
18 4235-4335 98.15 76.16 70 1781.33 
19 4335-4435 98.65 56.09 71 1415.86 
20 4435-4535 99.72 21.21 77 348.87 
21 4535-4635 116.58 197.54 78 4500.00 
22 4635-4735 117.01 73.01 81 2325.95 
23 4735-4835 123.81 37.99 86 298.15 
24 4835-4935 131.91 291.20 89 3693.84 
25 4935-5000 236.67 674.11 96 4500.00 
 
 
 
 
